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A MODEL FOR THE INTERVENTION OF A 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 




This paper builds a model for intervention and/or mitigation of a financial crisis by first identifying those 
conditions precedent to a systemic based financial crisis, and then outlying a process to integrate firm 
specific and systematic risk into a comprehensive strategic model. A simple application of the model was 
able to identify significant outliers. For example, using 2006 to 2010 data, Capital One Financial 
Corporation was identified for intervention from as early as 2006. This corporation received $3.56 
billion of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act Federal bailout funds. 
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n hindsight, regulators and analysts, alike, have been able to identify several factors that led to the 
Financial Crisis that began in 2007 (Poole, 2010b). The causes presented include factors such as: 
inadequate regulation; duration mismatch; federal subsidy of housing; federal subsidy of debt 
financing; moral hazard; interconnectedness of institutions; and unmanaged systematic risk (Lal, 2010; 
Poole, 2010a; Poole, 2010b; Scott 2010; Leondis, 2010; Ennis and Keister, 2010). Unfortunately, 
historically, bank regulations tend to be passed in response to various crises rather than to prevent them 
from occurring although there is no doubt that financial institutions play an integral role in the functioning 
of the economy and should be given priority (Barth et al. 2010; Holowecky et al. 2010). Therefore, going 
forward, the important question that needs to be answered is: In foresight, how can we prevent or mitigate 
future financial crises, and what regulation is required? 
 
The remainder of the paper attempts to answer that question. The next section is a continuation of the 
review of the literature introduced here in the introduction. The literature review focuses on identifying 
conditions precedent to a financial crisis, and then on building a model to prevent or mitigate future 
crises. The following section presents data and analysis of a simple application of the model. The final 
section summarizes the paper and makes recommendations for further research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
In reviewing the literature, prevention solution options presented include recommendations to: alter 
capital requirements; change clearing houses usage requirements; alter the way insolvent institutions are 
resolved; continue emergency lending by the Fed, and restructure the regulatory system All such solutions 
have been argued to be burdensome and ineffective to prevent a systematic risk based crisis (Scott, 2010). 
In his paper, Scott concentrated on reviewing the literature on the relevant recommendations of the 
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (CCMR) and The United States Treasury as well as pending 
congressional legislation. The CCMR is an independent, nonpartisan research organization founded in 
2005 to improve the regulation of United States capital markets. It consists of 30 leaders from the investor 
community, business, finance, law, accounting and academia (CCMR, 2011). 
 
I 




Evidence of the ineffectiveness of the proposed solutions is seen in the failure of Basel II, the 
recommendations on banking laws and regulations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision created by the central bank Governors of the Group of Ten nations passed in 2004. The Basel 
III documents submitted in 2009 attempt to answer the question of “What regulation is required?” and its 
provisions include: changes in the definition of capital; revisions to counter party credit capital standards; 
new global leverage ratio; explicit capital buffer standards; and new global liquidity standards (Holbrook, 
2010). Among other things, these provisions are an attempt to improve the regulation of the financial 
system but still leave significant systematic risk exposure which is one of the main factors that helped 
cause the crisis in the first place (Boerner, 2010; Holbrook, 2010; Weber, 2010; Triana, 2010). For 
example, Berger et al (2008) show that Bank Holding Companies (BHC) had been actively managing 
their capital ratios, had set targets substantially above regulatory minima and make rapid adjustments 
towards those targets. Even the new regulatory requirements under Basel III would not have been 
adequate to prevent the crisis. Triana (2010) further shows that Basel III: permits higher leverage (higher 
risk); has flawed risk measures; and restricts opportunities for higher potential returns – increases risks 
and lowers returns. 
 
If these solutions presented are indeed ineffective and/or incomplete then the use of early, reliable 
indicators to signal trouble and trigger intervention could prove invaluable. The next step then is to 
provide valuable information in answering the question of how to prevent or mitigate future financial 
crisis by focusing on managing systematic risk and by developing a model that identifies factors that can 
signal trouble and trigger intervention. 
 
Conditions Precedent of the Financial Crisis 
 
There have been many factors identified in the cause of the financial crisis that began in 2007 and there is 
no clear consensus as to whether regulatory reform would serve to prevent such a crisis from recurring. 
However, there is consensus on the following three conditions precedent: 
 
Large losses from lending and securitization: This is macro systematic risk related to over-exposure in an 
upswing of a credit cycle and being overly risk averse in a down cycle (Stucke, 2010). Risk build-up in an 
expansion is countercyclical (Weber, 2010). 
 
Interconnectedness: This is macro systematic risk related to the failure of one significant institution, 
which can cause or contribute to the failure of other significant institutions; and the possibility that one 
exogenous shock may cause or contribute to the failure of multiple significant financial institutions (Scott, 
2010). 
 
Loss of Confidence: This is macro systematic risk related to the level of financial transactions that are not 
regulated and/or protected, the level of uninsured deposits, credit default risk exposure, innovations such 
as information technology or information asymmetry (Scott, 2010; Poole, 2010a). Ennis and Keister 
(2010) conclude that financial crises have a self-fulfilling component and that the banks’ operating 




This paper contends that the measures of those conditions precedent can serve to provide early warning 
signals of changes in systematic risk and be used in conjunction with regulatory reform to trigger pre-
crisis intervention. Additionally, according to Allen and Saunders (2004) U.S. banking regulators have 
contended that 15-20 major banks and 5-10 major securities firms dominate critical financial markets, 
therefore as global financial markets consolidate and harmonize the possibility of contagion risk 




increases. However, this smaller list of key players could provide a more narrowly focused 
intervention/mitigation strategy. 
 
The hypothesis broadly stated, therefore, is: 
 
Decision to intervene = f (credit countercyclical risk, interconnectedness, loss of confidence)                (1)  
 
Allen and Saunders (2004) define pro-cyclicality as system-wide operational losses triggered by 
contagion across linked financial intermediaries. They surveyed the effects of pro-cyclicality on risk 
measures and found that, whereas a fundamentally strong institution can often recover from market and 
credit risk, it may be impossible for it to recover from certain operational risk events. Therefore, the main 
concerns are the low frequency/high severity risk events, which occur quite infrequently, consistent with 
the conditions precedent. 
 
Franz (2010) has shown that the stock market has been highly consistent in predicting economic 
expansions and contractions. Additionally, Tsai and Chang (2010) have also shown that since 
macroeconomic factors are affected by government actions, macroeconomic and firm specific factors 
must be dealt with separately. Their model establishes financial factors, market variables and 
macroeconomic variables, to successfully predict financial distress.  
 
A review of the literature relating to procyclicality tendencies of banking shows how banking capital 
requirements along with monetary policy actually results in the amplification of exogenous shocks. One 
key factor affecting the magnitude of the procyclical effect is measured by the composition of the banks’ 
asset portfolio (Drumond, 2009). This would then be combined with a measure of macroeconomic policy 
to estimate the systematic risk associated with procyclical effects. 
 
Measures of interconnectivity relate to size and so identification of those major banks and securities 
firms, that dominate the market, is critical. 
 
The factors leading to loss of confidence have to do with the innate fragility of the banking system and 
can be measured by the leading indicators such as the movement of the stock market as well as bank 




Step 1: Utilize a financial distress prediction model to identify firm specific risks such as a discrete-time 
hazard model like the multi-period logit model, which has been used successfully to estimate the 
significant parameters in predicting financial distress (Tsai and Chang, 2010, Shumway 2001; Barrow, 
1993). The assumed functional form of the logit model is the logistic function: 
Pr [Yi=1) = Pi =, )/(1( iwe+ ,                      i = 1...N                                                                (2) 
Where, 
Wi = b0 + ∑
m
bjxij                                                                                                                         (3)                       
is the logit transformation and is a linear combination of the independent variables and a set of 
coefficients bj = (b1, b2 ,...b m ) that can be estimated. N is the number of observations; x is the value of the 
jth variable of the ith observation; and Y sub i is a dependent variable that represents the final outcome: Y 
i = 1 for failed institutions, Y i = 0 for non-failures. 




For this application, it is assumed that there is some linear combination of the independent variables that 
is positively related to financial distress. If Wj exists, it is an index of that institution's propensity to fail or 
become solvent. 
Step 2: The parameters from Step 1 can then be used to identify problem financial in conjunction with a 
predetermined distress cut-off point. 
 
Step 3: To address the issues of interconnectivity and pro-cyclicality, the next step is to identify the large 
financial institutions that have a significant impact on economic activity. 
 




There were two key sources of banking data. The first is from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), 
a web-based business data research service from The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. 
Their Bank Regulatory Database contains five databases for regulated depository financial institutions. 
These databases provide accounting data for bank holding companies, commercial banks, savings banks, 
and savings and loans institutions. Their data comes from the required regulatory forms filed for 
supervising purposes. The second source of data is from the National Information Center (NIC), a central 
repository of data about banks and other institutions for which the Federal Reserve has a supervisory, 
regulatory, or research interest, including both domestic and foreign banking organizations operating in 
the United States. Their web site provides access to NIC data, allowing the public to search for detailed 
information about banking organizations. 
 
The NIC has a Bank Holding Company Peer Groups report that contains a summary of peer group 
financial data and a listing of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) in each Peer Group. BHCs with assets 
over $500 million are classified into one of nine tiers. Tier 1 consists of BHCs with consolidated assets of 
$10 Billion and over. Given that only the top 20 or so financial institutions dominate the financial 
markets, the top tier 1 banks with consolidated assets of $100 billion were selected for review. Table 1 
shows 22 institutions that met the criteria. These are the main institutions to monitor in addressing the 
interconnectedness and pro-cyclicality systematic risks considerations and therefore, the key financial 
institutions that should play a major role in the financial crisis intervention or mitigation process. Note, 
however, that the number is not static. 
 
Fundamental company data was provided by Capital IQ, a business owned by the Standard and Poors 
Company and accessible from WRDS. Capital IQ provides market data across all major quoted markets 
including equity, mutual funds, fixed income, indices, commodities, currencies, and rates. Equity pricing 
data includes close, open, bid, ask, mid, low, best, high price values along with volume, splits, dividends, 
ticker, exchange information, short interest data, and VWAP for select markets. Upon retrieving the data 
it was discovered that due to various reasons, such as reorganizations (TD Bank Holding Company, U.S. 
Bankcorp, Ally Financial Inc. and Citizens Financial Group) or is privately held (Taunu Corporations), 
there were only 17 BHCs with complete market price data for analysis. 
 
Following on Franz (2010), it is assumed that the stock market is consistent in anticipating economic 
cycles.  To confirm this assumption, S&P 500 index monthly data was compared with the adjusted stock 
prices for the 17 banks using the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r).  It ranges from +1 to 
-1.  A correlation of +1 means that there is a perfect positive linear relationship between variables.  Table 
2 and Figure 1 show the results for the five-year period reviewed, 2006 to 2010. 
 




Based on the “Rule of Thumb” shown in Table 3, there was a very strong correlation between the 
variables during the period 2006 and 2010, inclusive with no outliers.  The period 2006 was chosen to 
establish a base correlation before the financial crisis that began in 2007.  There was a high correlation 
between the variables with an outlier exception of Capital One Financial Corporation that had a 
correlation coefficient of -0.471 and was the recipient of $3.56 billion of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act Federal bailout in the form of a preferred stock purchase.  (WRDS, 2010).  The same 
analysis was done on 2010 to have current data.  The correlations in 2010 were moderate, on average, 
with the outlier exception of Bank of America Corporation, which had a correlation coefficient of -
0.0857.  It lost $2.24 billion for 2010 as gradual improvements in its core banking business were offset by 
charges linked to its disastrous 2008 acquisition of Countrywide Financial (WDRS, 2010).  Figure 1 
shows the correlation results as well as the magnitude of the outliers, banks number eleven and one, 
respectively. 
 
Table 1: BHCs with consolidated assets of $100 Billion and above as of 12/31/2010 
 
Rank Institution Name  Location Total Assets 12/31/2010 
($’000) 
1 Bank of America Corporation  Charlotte, NC $2,268,347,377 
2 JPMorgan Chase & Co.  New York, NY $2,117,605,000 
3 Citigroup Inc.  New York, NY $1,913,902,000 
4 Wells Fargo & Company San Francisco, CA $1,258,128,000 
5 Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,  New York, NY $911,330,000 
6 Morgan Stanley  New York, NY $807,698,000 
7 MetLife, Inc.  New York, NY $730,905,863 
8 Taunus Corporation  New York, NY $372,556,000 
9 HSBC North America Holdings Inc.  New York, NY $343,699,907 
10 U.S. Bancorp Minneapolis, MN $307,786,000 
11 PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., The  Pittsburgh, PA $264,414,112 
12 Bank Of New York Mellon Corporation,  The New York, NY $247,222,000 
13 Capital One Financial Corporation  Mclean, VA $197,503,411 
14 Td Bank Us Holding Company Portland, ME $176,972,361 
15 SunTrust Banks, Inc. Atlanta, GA $172,875,298 
16 Ally Financial Inc.  Detroit, MI $172,011,000 
17 State Street Corporation Boston, MA $158,890,975 
18 BB&T Corporation  Winston-Salem, NC $157,081,396 
19 American Express Company New York, NY $146,005,718 
20 Citizens Financial Group, Inc.  Providence, RI $129,969,527 
21 Regions Financial Corporation Birmingham, AL $132,399,290 
22 Fifth Third Bancorp Cincinnati, OH $111,006,778 
This table shows the 22 Tier 1 Bank Holding Companies with assets of $100 billion or more, taken from the list of top 50 BHCs. There were 34 










Table 2: The Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for the S&P 500 and Our Top Banks 
 
Period/Variable Average r 
for the 17 banks 
n 
Monthly statistics 2006-2010 0.836 60 
Monthly statistics 2006 0.728 12 
Monthly statistics 2010 0.581 12 
This table shows the results of the correlation analysis between the S&P 500 indices and the adjusted stock price for the 17 BHCs for the three 
time-periods indicated. 
 
Table 3: Rule of Thumb for Interpreting the Size of a Correlation Coefficient 
 
Size of Correlation Interpretation 
0.90 to 1.00 (-0.90 to -1.00) 
0.70 to 0.90 (-0.70 to -0.90) 
0.50 to 0.70 (-0.50 to -0.70) 
0.30 to 0.50 (-0.30 to -0.50) 
0.00 to 0.30 (  0.00 to -0.30) 




Little if any correlation 
Source: Hinkle DE, Wiersma W, Jurs SG. (1998). Applied Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, 4th ed. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company. 
 
Figure 1: Plot of the Correlation Coefficients for the 17 Institutions by Rank 
 
This figure 1 shows the correlation coefficient (r) between the monthly S&P 500 indices and the stock price of the top 17 banks using 2006 to 





This paper reviewed the literature on the causes of financial crises and many solution ideas, including 
those recommended by Basel III submitted in 2009, the Group of Ten’s Basel Committee on Banking 
Regulation.  The suggestions presented were found to be either ineffective or incomplete.  After closely 
reviewing the proposals and analyses submitted by regulators and analysts, there seemed to be consensus 
on three key systematic risk factors: large losses from lending and securitization; interconnectedness; and 
loss of confidence.  A four-step process is then presented.  Critical to the process is the ability to predict 
firm specific risks separate from macroeconomic risks.  A simple application of the model using 2006 to 
2010 data showed how, for example, Capital One Corporation could and should have been flagged for 
intervention from 2006, before anyone had an idea of the crisis to come.  In addition, the model has 
flagged Bank of America Corporation, using the 2010 data.  
 
The application of the model used only one variable, however the full application of the model could use 



















this paper could integrate the four steps, and using all relevant variables, such as bank specific risk 
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